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water involve the disposition of property. Moreover, the first court
(federal or state), that assumes jurisdiction over real property, will be
the one to have continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over that
property. Thus, because Nevada law treats water rights as real
property, and the federal decree court was the first to adjudicate the
subject water rights in 1936, the Nevada Supreme Court held the
federal decree court had "exclusive" jurisdiction. The federal decree
court also had "continuing" jurisdiction because a lawsuit covering
substantially the same issues and parties as the ones in the present case
was currently pending before it. Next, although the Nevada Supreme
Court recognizes it has original jurisdiction to issue the writ of
mandamus, such relief will only be available when the action to be
compelled is one that the law already requires. However, if a
petitioner shows that writ relief is urgent and necessary, the court may,
nevertheless, grant the same.
A writ of prohibition is "the
counterpart" of the writ of mandate. It does not correct any errors,
but its purpose is to prevent courts from over-extending the limits of
their judicial power. In short, both writs are a form of extraordinary
remedy that will not be issued if petitioner has at his disposal a "plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The
court is not obligated to issue such writs because they are purely
discretionary.
Because
Petitioners
failed
to
demonstrate
extenuating
circumstances existed to warrant the issuance of the writs, and because
they had a more appropriate forum in which to seek remedy-the
federal decree court-the Nevada Supreme Court denied Mineral
County's request for relief.
Gloria M. Soto
United States v. State Eng'r, 27 P.3d 51 (Nev. 2001) (holding that
judicial review was warranted when the State Engineer went beyond
the "plain meaning" of a statute when he denied stockwater permits to
the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management).
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") filed nine stockwater
permit applications for public lands in Douglas County, Nevada. The
State Engineer for the state of Nevada denied these applications on
the grounds that the BLM was not a qualified applicant under the
terms of a Nevada statute. Section 533.503 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes regulates state water appropriation permits that allow livestock
watering on public lands. The BLM petitioned the Ninth Judicial
District Court, Douglas County, Nevada, for judicial review of the nine
denied permit applications. The court denied judicial review, and the
BLM then appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
The supreme court examined the scope and constitutionality of
the statute at issue. Section 533.503 of the Nevada Revised Statutes
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provides "the state engineer shall not issue a permit to appropriate
water for the purpose of watering livestock on public lands unless the
applicant for the permit is legally entitled to place the livestock on the
public lands for which the permit is sought."
Argument centered over the meaning of "legally entitled." The
BLM contended that the plain language of the statute authorizes the
State Engineer to issue stockwater permits to the United States as
landowner of public lands. The BLM argued the plain meaning of
"legally entitled" meant that either the landowner, or a person with the
landowner's permission to use the land, was legally entitled to place
livestock on the land.
The State Engineer contended that "legally entitled to place
livestock on the land for which the permit is sought" excluded the
United States because it does not possess either a grazing permit or
lease through the BLM. The State Engineer argued that the United
States, as owner of public land, must issue itself a BLM permit to place
livestock on its land.
The standard of review applied in cases of statutory construction is
de novo. Because statute authorized the State Engineer to administer
the stockwater permits, the court gave statutory interpretations of that
office "great deference." Though the decision of the State Engineer
was not controlling, it was presumed correct and the burden or
proving error fell on the challenging party, The BLM.
In evaluating these conflicting interpretations, the Supreme Court
of Nevada held that for a statute to be considered ambiguous it must
be capable of two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations.
However, the State Engineer's interpretation, that the United States,
the owner of public land must issue itself a permit or lease to graze
livestock upon the land that it owns was an "illogical and unreasonable
construction of statutory language." With this interpretation the State
Engineer exceeded his authority by ignoring the plain meaning of the
statute. On those grounds, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the
order of the district court and remanded the matter with directions to
grant the petition forjudicial review.
ErikaDelaney-Lew

OHIO
City of Hudson v. County of Sununit, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2601
(Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 2001) (holding that a water system does not
pass by operation of law at the merger of townships, and a county may
only sell a water system to the municipality that the water system
services).
Subsequent to the creation of Hudson Township, developers
created and conveyed a water system to Summit County ("County") for

